Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses the interesting halakhic idea of “Kavua.” Regarding most Torah prohibitions, the majority annuls the minority, and the prohibited substance or item is discounted. Yet, there are certain objects or situations where the solidity and fixedness interfere with nullification. The classic example is the “Ten Stores” case, as described in Pesachim (9b):

דִּתְנַן: תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת, כּוּלָּן מוֹכְרִין בְּשַׂר שְׁחוּטָה, וְאַחַת מוֹכֶרֶת בְּשַׂר נְבֵלָה, וְלָקַח מֵאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵע מֵאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן לָקַח — סְפֵיקוֹ אָסוּר.

With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person took meat from one of them and he does not know from which one he took the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. This ruling is based on the principle: The legal status of an item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced. In this case, when it comes to determining whether or not this meat comes from a kosher store, the two types of stores are regarded as though they were equal in number.

וּבַנִּמְצָא — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב.

And in the case of meat found outside, follow the majority. If most stores in the city sell kosher meat, one can assume that the meat he found is kosher, based on the principle: Any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority.

While much ink has been spilled to explain the underlying logic as to why in case number one the meat is forbidden, and in case number two it is permitted, the Torah rule is Kavua disrupts bitul, a strongly fixed object interferes in nullification. When the person’s question revolves around the stores (i.e., which store he bought from), since stores are distinct and not movable, we cannot nullify the non-kosher store in the majority of kosher stores. Yet, if the person found the meat in the street, though technically he is considering which store the meat came from, here he can use the statistical majority that most of the meat in town is kosher. This is because the item in question is the piece of meat in front of you, which is movable and not fixed, and is then subject to nullification by the majority of kosher meat that is around.

I always appreciate a good “chassidishe vort,” which brings metaphysical depth to dry legal teachings. Ben Yehoyada (Berachos 35a) applies the idea of Kavua to Torah study. There is an obligation to have specific, consistent, and daily times for Torah study, known as “keviyyas ittim” (Shabbos 31a and Shulkhan Arukh (OC 155:1). What is the difference between a person who studies when he can but does not have a seder or a fixed routine? Ben Yehoyada says that normally, if we spend most of our time working, our Torah time will be considered a minority and be nullified and characterized by the majority. However, when the study time is fixed, it resists nullification and maintains its distinct character.

Fixations can become too rigid, or can serve as a constructive anchor to maintain character and identity. Especially when it comes to Torah study, it is often difficult for family men to find the balance between making sacrifices by sticking to the routine, versus being unreasonably inflexible. Then aside from the moral calculations, there are people who have obsessively rigid personalities and cannot handle changing routine. The value placed on the tradition that one must be consistent and timely in Torah study might excessively override the concerns of others who need help, or even personal concerns for self-care. Sometimes an underdeveloped sense of empathy or attunement contributes to overvaluing the technical requirements and minimizing the needs of others. A perfectionist is likely to ignore others’ feelings or even his own, out of a pervasive fear of not meeting the expectation. Yet, another person may be slacking and lacking in the healthy discipline and consistency necessary for Torah study to have its full impact and not get overwhelmed by the majority of daily pressures and activities.

My father Z”L showed me how the Rambam (Laws of Torah Study 1:8) famously addresses this time management challenge:

כָּל אִישׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל חַיָּב בְּתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה בֵּין עָנִי בֵּין עָשִׁיר בֵּין שָׁלֵם בְּגוּפוֹ בֵּין בַּעַל יִסּוּרִין בֵּין בָּחוּר בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה זָקֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁתָּשַׁשׁ כֹּחוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה עָנִי הַמִּתְפַּרְנֵס מִן הַצְּדָקָה וּמְחַזֵּר עַל הַפְּתָחִים וַאֲפִלּוּ בַּעַל אִשָּׁה וּבָנִים חַיָּב לִקְבֹּעַ לוֹ זְמַן לְתַלְמוּד תּוֹרָה בַּיּוֹם וּבַלַּיְלָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (יהושע א ח) "וְהָגִיתָ בּוֹ יוֹמָם וָלַיְלָה":

Every Jewish man is obligated to study Torah, whether he is poor or rich, whether his body is healthy and whole or afflicted by difficulties, whether he is young or an old man whose strength has diminished. Even if he is a poor man who derives his livelihood from charity and begs from door to door, even if he is a husband and [a father of] children, he must establish a fixed time for Torah study during the day and at night, as [Joshua 1:8] commands: "You shall think about it day and night."

My father observed that stylistically, the Rambam seems to go from lighter distractions and pressures to harder ones, thus he starts with rich or poor, healthy or unhealthy, and then progresses to “extremely old and weak” and “so poor as needing to beg door to door.” There is still one excuse on the list, which now we should presume will be the most challenging of all, making it even harder to learn than extreme poverty or old age. The final excuse: “A husband and father of children!” Yes, apparently that is the hardest challenge!

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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