Our Gemara on Amud Beis refers to the fine paid by the owner of an ox who gores and kills a Canaative slave. The amount is set at 30 shekel, regardless of the actual worth of the slave.  The gemara considers this a stringency, which then has implications in terms of inferences to and from other related laws, via reasoning of a kal v’chomer. The commentaries raise an obvious question: Why is this fixed amount assumed to be a stringency? If the slave was worth a large amount of money, it would actually be a leniency as compared to paying full value!

Rashba answers simply that the majority of times the slave is typically worth less than 30 shekel, so it is de facto a stringency to always require payment of 30 shekel.  Tosafos offers a different idea. Tosafos says the very nature of utilizing a fixed amount conveys a certain severity and harshness.  How does it do so?

To better understand Tosafos’ logic we must understand the psychology of fines.  What is the message when society, through a legal system issues a fine instead of demanding financial compensation and restitution? The demand of fixed fine signals to the offender that he has committed a moral violation, and is culpable for something beyond damage. It is a punishment and deterrent by society’s messaging disapproval of the act via the fine. On the other hand, a legal process that asks for payments of damages, focuses less on the moral violation and more on the need to restore and pay back the damage.  Therefore, fines have a different psychological effect than rulings about legal damages, and are more intensely focussed on correcting unwanted behavior regardless of the financial loss, big or small.  

The research supports this as well, having implications for policymakers in schools and other institutions which may use fines and financial restitution as forms of regulation and control. According to researchers Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (“A Fine is a Price”, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX (January 2000) fines do not always work out as planned.  Gneezy and Rustichini tested out the deterrent hypothesis via a field study at a daycare in Israel.  Being parents of k”ah large families, and being Jewish about timeliness, we can easily imagine frustration on the part of daycare staff who wait for parents to show up late in picking up their kids.  In the study, for the first four weeks, parents who came late were simply recorded.  For the next twelve weeks, parents were given a financial fine.  Incredibly, subsequent to the imposition of a fine, the number of tardy parents INCREASED.  Furthermore, when they tried to dial back and eliminate the fine, the numbers remained constant at the increased level.

How do we explain such a phenomenon, aside from shrugging and saying, “We Jews are a stiff-necked people”?  Researchers Tim Kurz, William Edward Thomas and Miguel A. Fonseca may have found the answer.  (“A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted publicly.” September 2014, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 54):

According to their research, two factors seem to make the difference between an effective fine and a non-effective one.  If the fine is framed as a punishment and it is public, it conveys moral and social disapproval, and thus acts as a deterrent.  If it is framed merely as a form of financial restitution, then it is less effective. When a person gets a parking ticket, they hate it, but do not usually feel it is a moral criticism about their moral responsibility as a citizen. In regard to the parents of the daycare center, because they were paying a fine for their tardiness, they might have rationalized that the staff was getting paid extra for the time anyhow. If they were told this is rude and they are being fined for their rudeness, perhaps coupled with the frowns of the teachers and administration, our theory holds they would be less likely to rationalize.  

Compare this to how many people view parking tickets or speed camera tickets.  Most do not consider it as if they did something immoral by speeding or driving dangerously. They just see the ticket as a cost of doing business for not following an arbitrary and silly rule by the government. (*Sigh*. This is especially true if one gets the sense that the requirement of 25 mph is so absurd, it is merely another form of taxation. Additionally, if the law is applied unequally, as evidenced by an unusual number of scratched or faded license plates on cars parked near police stations, presumably owned by officers and officials, which evade cameras.  Perhaps the only bit of truthful journalism emanating from the NY Times in the last 20 years, see https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/17/nyregion/license-plate-vigilantes.html )  But a true fine conveys moral outrage and condemnation and may be highly effective.

That can explain why there is a fine for an ox that gores a Canaanite slave, but not a free-man.  If a free-man was killed by an ox, then there must be financial restitution. For a free man, the guilt and recognition of the loss of life is automatic and does not require reinforcement, thus payment of actual damage is the key concern of Torah society. However, one might rationalize or minimize the death of a slave, thus the Torah seeks to emphasize punishment and not payment. 

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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