Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the social status of, and obligation to disclose upon, the person in exile:

In the case of a murderer who was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city sought to honor him due to his prominence, he shall say to them: I am a murderer. If the residents of the city say to him: We are aware of your status and nevertheless we wish to honor you, he may accept the honor from them.

The Yerushalmi Shevi’is (10:3), also quoted by Orchos Tzaddikim (21:Shaar Hasheker), derives from this a general principle about honesty and truth:

The eighth category of falsehood is he who boasts of qualities that he does not possess. And this is a great sin. And even if he really possesses these qualities, when he praises himself, it appears from his words that he did not do his charitable or generous acts for the sake of Heaven, but for his own sake, for his own praise. And our Sages, of blessed memory, said, “He whom others honor because they believe that he knows two tractates of the Talmud, and he knows only one tractate, is obligated to say, ‘I know only one tractate.’ All the more so is it forbidden to lie and to boast about qualities that one does not possess at all.”

This relates to the sugya of geneivas daas—misleading people through actions, directly or indirectly, which is termed as “theft of thoughts.” However, although it is forbidden to mislead people, it seems that to passively allow them to operate under their own assumptions, even if false, might be permitted. The primary halachic source for this is the Gemara Chulin (94b):

The Gemara cites proof that it is permitted to allow others to mislead themselves. It is like this incident when Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, was going from the city of Sikhra to the city of Bei Meḥoza, and at the same time Rava and Rav Safra were going to Sikhra. They met each other, and Mar Zutra thought they were coming out to greet him. He said to them: Why did the Rabbis exert themselves and come all this way to greet me? Rav Safra said to him: We did not know that the Master was coming; if we would have known, we would have exerted ourselves more.

Rav Safra’s admirable and excessive honesty was not necessarily considered appropriate by Rava. He stated:

Rava said to Rav Safra: What is the reason that you said this to Mar Zutra? By telling him that we were not coming to greet him, you upset him. Rav Safra said to Rava: But if I would not have said so, we would have misled him. Rava responded: Mar Zutra misled himself, since we never said we were coming to greet him.

And so it is codified in Shulchan Aruch (CM 228:6):

It is forbidden to deceive people in business transactions or to mislead them, such as: if there is a defect in the item being sold, the seller must inform the buyer—even if the buyer is a non-Jew. For example, one may not sell non-kosher meat under the pretense that it is kosher slaughtered meat.

It is also forbidden to mislead others in matters that only appear to be done for their benefit, but are not actually done for them. How so? One should not press his friend to join him for a meal when he knows the friend will not accept. Nor should he overdo the offering of food or drink when he knows the guest will decline. He should not open barrels [of wine or produce] that had already been opened for a storekeeper (a grocer), giving the impression he is opening them in the guest’s honor—unless he explicitly informs him that they were not opened for his sake.

However, if it is something that the other person ought to have considered and realized on his own—that it was not being done for his honor—and he misleads himself into thinking it was, such as when someone encounters his friend on the road and assumes the friend came out specifically to greet and honor him, then it is not necessary to correct or clarify the misunderstanding.

How does this align with what we saw in the Orchos Tzaddikim and Yerushalmi? We might say that those cases were referring to a situation where the evidence was more indicative of deserving the credit or honor falsely, and therefore there still might be an obligation to clarify and set the record straight. In other words, to passively allow somebody to deceive themselves would seem to be permitted. However, if the circumstances are such that de facto he would be deceived, one ordinarily ought to clarify. There may be an exception if the intention is not to deceive and there is an overall benefit, such as giving the person honor (see ibid 7).

However, we might offer a different distinction. In the case of the exile, he is, after all, supposed to suffer to some degree. Perhaps he’s not allowed to receive honor because in some way he should bear his shame. If you say this, how then would it be a support to the directive of the Yerushalmi and Orchos Tzaddikim? The answer might be that, although it is for a different reason, there is a similar moral imperative to refrain from receiving excessive recognition for having achieved a modicum of success and knowledge in Torah. If you pay attention to the precise text of the Orchos Tzaddikim, you can see that he is also referring to some aspect of modesty:

“And even if he really possesses these qualities, when he praises himself, it appears from his words that he did not do his charitable or generous acts for the sake of Heaven, but for his own sake, for his own praise.”

Therefore, we can conclude that, though it is forbidden to mislead somebody, and yet it is permitted to passively allow others to make assumptions that are not stimulated excessively by the circumstances or your behavior. But if it leads to inappropriate self-aggrandizement, it still is not proper.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com