Our Gemara discusses a technical piece regarding the Shavuous sacrifice that has interesting moral and halachic implications. However, to fully appreciate them, we must first understand the basic text and legal reasoning. The Gemara states:

“Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata taught a baraisa before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one slaughtered four sheep for Shavuos, rather than the required two, accompanied by two loaves, he draws two of the sheep out of the four and sprinkles their blood not for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos. He then sprinkles the blood of the other sheep for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos.

As, if you do not say to do this, but rather require him first to sprinkle the blood of two of the sheep for their own sake, then you have caused the loss of the latter two sheep. Since they were previously fit to have their blood sprinkled on the altar for the sake of the sheep of Shavuos, and were disqualified from this status when the blood of the other two sheep was sprinkled for that purpose, they are no longer fit to have their blood sprinkled even for the sake of a different offering.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata: And does the court say to a person: Arise and sin in order that you may gain? Is it proper for the priest to sprinkle the blood of the first pair not for their own sake so that the second pair will remain fit?”

[in other words, at this point the Gemara assumes that it is improper to commit a sin even in order to achieve a higher purpose, such as fulfillment of the overall mitzvah. The Gemara cites a precedent from a different case where the limbs of an olah sacrifice are intermingled with the limbs of a chattas sacrifice. In such a case, we do not offer the entirety of the limbs on the altar, which would treat the limbs of the chattas as if they were wood, even though this would accomplish the overall positive goal of allowing the olah sacrifice to proceed with its full process.]

Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata answered Rabbi Yoḥanan: We indeed do say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a sin offering, since it is the same type of offering. Similarly, one may sin with regard to the sheep of Shavuos in order to gain with regard to the other sheep brought for the same offering.

We do not say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a burnt offering. Therefore, the Rabbis prohibit burning the limbs of the sin offering on the altar in order to allow for the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering.

The Gemara similarly refines this ruling and states: We do say: Arise and sin on Shabbos in order that you may gain on Shabbos, i.e., in order to allow lambs of the Shavuos offering to be eaten on Shavuos that occurs on Shabbos. We do not say: Arise and sin on Shabbos in order that you may gain on a weekday—any process that would preserve the eimurin (choice inner fats and certain internal organs) which are meant to be burned after Shabbos.”

The essential element of discussion in the Gemara is that, at times, one is permitted to commit a sinful act that will preserve an overall mitzvah. The proviso seems to be that it must be directly connected to the very same mitzvah and not performed to preserve or enact a different one.

Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 102:4) rules that it is forbidden to pass in front of (within four cubits of) a person who is praying Shemoneh Esreh. One of the reasons given is that it disrupts his concentration. It is a dispute among the poskim whether it is permitted to pass on his side while angling toward the front, and it is brought in Mishna Berura (ibid.) that even on the side laterally it is forbidden according to the Zohar. Regardless, it is forbidden to pass directly in front, and this is an important halacha that people tend to ignore because of challenging practical implications when confronted with a crowded shul.

On the website Halacha Yomit from Maran Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l, he rules (https://halachayomit.co.il/he/default.aspx?HalachaID=1278):

A very common situation occurs when a person arrives at the synagogue and the congregation is already standing in prayer. He wishes to pass in front of those praying in order to pray himself. It is clear that he may not pass before them; rather, he must wait until they finish their prayer, and only then may he pass and go to his place.

However, the question arises whether one may be lenient for the sake of praying with a congregation (tefillah b’tzibbur). That is, when a person knows that in order to pray together with the congregation he must pass in front of others who are praying so that he too can have a place to stand.

In the responsa Yad Eliyahu, this issue is discussed based on the rule “aseh docheh lo ta‘aseh”—a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Since the prohibition against passing in front of someone praying is a rabbinic negative prohibition, and prayer with a congregation is likewise a rabbinic mitzvah, it would seemingly follow that the person may pass in front of those praying, transgressing a rabbinic prohibition which would be set aside for the sake of fulfilling the rabbinic positive mitzvah of praying with a minyan.

However, in practice he writes that one should not be lenient. The rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition applies only when, at the very moment one violates the prohibition, he simultaneously fulfills the positive commandment. In this case, the person first violates the prohibition by passing in front of those praying and only afterward stands to pray with the congregation. Thus, at the time of the violation, no positive commandment is yet being fulfilled. Therefore, there is no basis for leniency.

In the work Halacha Berurah, the proposed leniency is rejected for an additional reason: it is not at all clear that prayer with a minyan is formally classified as a rabbinic positive commandment. Consequently, this mitzvah certainly cannot override the prohibition against passing in front of those praying.

Thus far is from the writings of Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l. However, one may raise a question based on our Gemara’s sugya. Until this point, the discussion concerns the rule of aseh docheh lo ta‘aseh. Yet according to our Gemara, which states, “Sin in order that you may merit that mitzvah”—and so rules the Rambam (Pesulei HaMukdashin 6:20, and this also appears implied in the Rama O.C. 276:2 based on the responsa Kesav Sofer, O.C. 10)—perhaps it would be permitted to pass before someone praying so that he himself may pray.

Nevertheless, this would not constitute permission to pass before someone praying for the sake of a different necessary mitzvah, as we also saw in our Gemara.

It is therefore puzzling to me why Rav Ovadia Yosef and Yad Eliyahu did not compare this case to that ruling. Possibly they held that permission to incur wrongdoing applies only when it concerns one’s own mitzvah, but not where doing so harms another person’s mitzvah (even if it is the same mitzvah) by disturbing his concentration. For, to paraphrase the Gemara (Sanhedrin 74a), mi yemar dim’acha sumak tefei—who says your tears of prayer are more important than your peer? 

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, LMFT, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com